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Abstract 
 
Since 2004, Forbes has proposed a list of the most valuable soccer clubs. One year later 
Transfermarkt began to estimate European soccer players’ value. This article estimate the 
determinants of firm values in European soccer over the period 2005-2013 incorporating 
player valuations, clubs’ operating income and new ownership, three variables not included 
previously. The results of this study demonstrate that these variables are significant factors in 
club valuations. More generally, club assets including stadium age, club ownership type, 
supporter numbers and income and past sports performances all have a significant impact.  
 
Keywords: club value, player value, operating income, new ownership, European soccer, 
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Introduction 
 
During the summer of 2013, the Welsh soccer player Gareth Bale was transferred from 
Tottenham Hotspur to Real Madrid for an amount estimated to 100M€. In current euros, Bale 
became the world’s most expensive soccer player ahead of Cristiano Ronaldo (94M€ in 
2009) and Zinedine Zidane (75M€ in 2001), both also acquired by Real Madrid1. 
Interestingly, his net salary of 10M€ per year2 does not merit his inclusion in the Top 8 
highest earning soccer players in the world3. The reported transfer prices and salaries in 
soccer demonstrate that players are the key component for a professional soccer club and 
justify that their prospective services must be recognised as an accounting asset (Morrow, 
1996). These observations seem obvious and can be applied to any other sport. However, 
player value has never been incorporated among determinants of professional sports firm 
value in any previous studies. Yet, players are an asset of each club and those acquired on the 
transfer market are reported as such in clubs’ balance sheets. If it is possible to demonstrate 
that player values have a significantly positive impact on club values, then it could contribute 
to justifying the sums expended by some clubs on transfers and salaries. Historically, the 
problem in doing so arose from the unavailability for data about player values. However, 
since 2005 a German website (www.transfermarkt.de) has provided data about European 
soccer player values. Despite the website name, an estimated value is provided for all players, 
not just those who have been the subject of a transfer. Fans discuss player values in the 
Transfermarkt (2012)’s market value forum with the necessity to justify their calculation – 
these are then taken into consideration by transfermarkt in addition to its experts’ evaluations 
in its update of player values. In this article, player values as per Transfermarkt are included 
among the determinants of European soccer club values. 
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As for player values, no prior studies tested for a significantly positive impact of profit. A 
hypothesis can be proposed to explain the fact that profit has never been included among the 
determinants of professional sports firm values: the current profit of a firm is not significant 
in explaining a firm’s value. This suggests that revenues may be a better basis upon which to 
calculate value than profit because revenues are a good indication of a club’s capacity to 
generate cash, whereas profit depends on financial management, any change in which can 
influence a firm’s capacity to generate profit. Nevertheless, revenues should not be 
incorporated among the determinants of Forbes values since these values are calculated as a 
“multiple of revenues” (Fort, 2006; Geckil, Mahon & Anderson, 2007; Vine, 2004). Besides, 
an effective financial management team could itself be a determinant of club values. In this 
article, we propose to test the impact of operating income on value; this being used as a proxy 
for profit which is not always available. 
Until 2004 no publicly valuation of European soccer teams was available. During that year, 
Forbes proposed for the first time a list of the 20 most valuable European soccer teams. 
Forbes interest in European soccer teams could be the consequence of increasing revenues in 
European soccer since the 1980s (Andreff & Staudohar, 2000). The fact that the valuation of 
European teams is so recent and incorporates only the 20 or 25 most valuable soccer teams 
doubtless explains why there had been no study of the determinants of European team values 
until as late as 2011 (Helleu, Scelles & Durand, 2011; Scelles, Helleu & Durand, 2012). It 
also explains why it is not possible to access more data or to extend the time period of 
analysis. Nevertheless, an analysis about the determinants of European soccer team values is 
useful for an improved understanding of determinants of professional team values, in 
particular because the availability of data on player values allows us to test their impact on 
team values. 
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Another point which could extend our knowledge about determinants of professional team 
values – perhaps more in the specific European context – is the test of the impact on club 
values of changes in the ownership framework of European soccer clubs. Since the beginning 
of the twenty-first century, a number of prominent clubs have been acquired by investors 
from the United States (e.g., Malcolm Glazer [Manchester United], initially George Gillett 
and Tom Hicks, and then John Henry [Liverpool] and Randy Lerner [Aston Villa]), Russia 
(e.g., Roman Abramovich [Chelsea] and Dmitry Rybolovlev [Monaco]) and the Middle East 
(e.g., Sheihk Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan [Manchester City], Sheihk Abdullah ben Nasser 
Al Thani [Malaga], Suleyman Kerimov [Anzhi Makhachkala] and the Qatar Investment 
Authority [Paris-Saint-Germain]). American investors are generally seen as profit maximizers 
whereas Russian and Middle Eastern investors are often considered as financially irrational. 
We will not focus on these differing objectives or on local community reaction to this influx 
of foreign capital (Bi, 2013), but instead observe the impact of new foreign ownership on 
club values. 
In this article, we estimate the determinants of firm values in European soccer over the period 
2005-2013, incorporating operating income and player value. The principal objective is to 
determine whether these factors are significant and, if so, to identify implications. If 
operating income and player value are significant, they should be included in future research, 
in particular about American professional team values. More specifically in European soccer, 
we will test the impact of new ownership on firm values. The paper consists of five parts. 
First, we present its theoretical basis, before going on to specify our empirical model and 
describe our data. In the third section we present our results. The results are discussed in the 
fourth section along with their implications and future research directions, with the final 
section of the paper setting out our conclusions.  
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Theoretical basis 
 
Contributions about firm values are numerous in the managerial literature. By contrast, to our 
knowledge, there are only seven published papers that deal with determinants of professional 
sports firm values. These can be separated into two groups: those concerning real transaction 
prices (Humphreys & Lee, 2010; Humphreys & Mondello, 2008), in which the oldest data 
dates back to the 1960s and leagues are not distinguished (except via dummies); and those 
concerning values determined other than by transaction through Financial World and Forbes 
(Alexander & Kern, 2004; Büschemann & Deutscher, 2011; Miller, 2007, 2009; Scelles 
Helleu, Durand & Bonnal, 2013a), for which data continue or begin in the 1990s or even the 
2000s, and each league is analyzed separately. 
 
What are Forbes’ values? 
 
Prior to the literature review, it is important to clarify the nature of the team values provided 
by Forbes. Unfortunately, Forbes is somewhat vague about this: “Current values are Forbes 
estimates based on past transactions, enterprise values (market value plus debt) of publicly 
traded teams and current stadium deal (unless a new stadium is pending).” (Forbes, 2007). As 
noted in the Introduction section, Forbes values are calculated as a “multiple of revenues” 
(Fort, 2006; Geckil et al., 2007; Vine, 2004). Fort (2006, p. 12) writes that Michael Ozanian, 
one of the authors of the Forbes team valuation reports, revealed that those reports are a 
“multiple of revenues” estimate, adjusted for specific stadium/arena lease factors estimated 
by those authors. Vine (2004, p. 9) indicates that Forbes prefers the use of revenue rather than 
operating income because it is more representative of long term values. This is consistent 
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with the hypothesis suggested in the Introduction to explain why operating income has never 
been incorporated among the determinants of professional team values in previous research.  
Geckil et al. (2007) also stress the “income approach”. They note that Forbes has no specific 
methodology and the author’s judgment is a significant part of the valuation method but they 
consider that this is an unavoidable part of estimating the value of any company. For this 
reason, they conclude that “the Forbes estimates should be accorded some respect as a 
consistently presented effort to systematically estimate values, with at least a selection of 
supporting data and commentary.” (Geckil et al., 2007, p. 2). 
 
Literature review about the determinants of professional sports firm values 
 
The literature review highlights several determinants of professional sports firm values. Vine 
(2004) incorporates revenue among determinants of value and finds that this is the most 
important factor. Nevertheless, we are not convinced by the decision to include revenue 
among determinants of value since, as specified by Vine (2004), it is representative of long 
term values. In our opinion, it is necessary to distinguish what is “representative” (essence) 
and what is “explanatory” (determinants). More generally, Vine (2004) testes different 
sources of revenues (gate receipts, other revenues) that we consider as “representative” rather 
than “explanatory” of value. This explains why Vine (2004) is not included in our table of 
synthesis (Table 1). 
Alexander and Kern (2004) use real, per-capita income to control for differences in ticket 
demand that will affect a team’s revenue and, hence, franchise profitability. The authors also 
use a city’s population to control for market-size effects on franchise profitability. Large 
market teams have a larger potential fan base to support their franchises and, hence, are in a 
better position to fill their stadium or arena and negotiate lucrative cable television contracts. 
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Alexander and Kern use a team’s final standing from the previous season. They expect a 
negative sign because as team performance worsens (e.g., first to fourth), revenue will likely 
decrease (diminution of the team’s reputation or of the renewal of season tickets by holders). 
They also use regional identity and expect a positive effect because of an appeal to a larger 
geographic fan base. They use an indicator variable called “new facility” that equals 1 if the 
team is playing in a new stadium or arena, and 0 otherwise. They anticipate a positive impact 
because it affords owners additional revenue generating means such as luxury suites and 
enhanced concession revenues. 
The variables used by Alexander and Kern are partially chosen by Miller (2007, 2009). He 
extends sports performance to the current year and replaces standings by winning 
percentages. He also replaces “new facility” by facility age, considering this to be a more 
accurate measure of the “newness” of a facility. He includes franchise age, years in city and 
an ownership dummy equal to 1 for teams playing in stadiums or arenas owned by that team 
and expects a positive effect for private ownership in comparison with public ownership on 
franchise profitability. 
Humphreys and Mondello (2008) incorporate competing teams in the market in their 
valuation. Their argument is that professional teams in a metropolitan area are competitors, 
and hence the presence of more competitors reduces the franchise sale price, holding other 
market characteristics like metropolitan population constant. They also include team winning 
percentage during the five last years, whereas Humphreys and Lee (2010) integrate this 
percentage over the previous 10 years. 
Büschemann and Deutscher (2011) include attendees per game. They assume that, since each 
attendee generates revenue for the franchise, the higher the number of attendees, the greater 
the team value. In measuring this revenue stream, they make use of team marketing annual 
reports from the Fan Cost Index (FCI), which are constructed annually for each franchise. 
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The FCI tracks the cost of attending a sporting event for a family of four. The more a 
franchise is able to charge for their tickets and other amenities, the more revenues they 
generate. Thus, the authors presume that the coefficient for the FCI would also be positively 
related to the team value. They incorporate the team payroll and assume that a team with high 
payroll expenses would offer a superior team quality and, therefore, would provide a better 
utility to fans. Due to this assumption, they anticipate that higher team expenses would 
positively influence the team value. 
Scelles et al. (2013a) use historical sports performance, measured by the percentage of 
championship titles since the beginning of the competition. A summary of these results is 
provided in Table 1. We indicate the sign of the coefficient for the variables. 
 
Empirical model and data description 
 
Empirical model 
 
The empirical model that we examine takes the form of: 
Fti = Xtiβ+εti                 (1) 
Fti is the logarithm of the franchise value of team i in year t, Xti is a matrix of independent 
variables that affect the team’s value, β is a vector of parameters to be estimated and εti is a 
vector of random error terms. We chose the logarithm of the franchise values because these 
ones are not equally distributed (Büschemann & Deutscher, 2011). 
The Xti matrix includes variables used in previous studies (Alexander & Kern, 2004; Miller, 
2007, 2009; Humphreys and Mondello, 2008; Humphreys and Lee, 2010; Büschemann and 
Deutscher, 2011; Scelles et al., 2013a): 
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- the logarithms of regional annual real per capita income and Functional Urban Area 
(FUA) population and the number of other clubs ranked in Forbes lists in the FUA (local 
competition); 
- facility age (difference between the season of the observation and the season in which it 
first opened); 
- a dummy for private ownership (1 if private, 0 if public); 
- annual average attendance; 
- sports performance in t, t-1 and historically (percentage of championship titles) both in 
national championships and at the continental level (Champions League). 
In national championships, sports performance in t and t-1 corresponds to the percentage of 
wins and draws. It is important to stress the particular case of Juventus FC in 2006-2007. As 
a result of the Calciopoli scandal, Juventus FC was relegated in 2006 (Scelles et al., 2013a). It 
was ranked last for the season 2005-2006 in the Italian Serie A, hence our decision to allocate 
it seven wins – equivalent to the number of points earned by Treviso, the team that would 
otherwise have finished in last place. For season 2006-2007 in Italian Serie B, we divided 
Juventus FC’s percentage of wins and draws by two. We proceeded in the same way for 
Leeds United in 2004-2005 and Newcastle United in 2009-2010. 
In the Champions League, sports performance in t and t-1 corresponds to a measure with a 
predetermined code: 
- 6 for a champion title; 
- 5 for final; 
- 4 for semi-final; 
- 3 for quarter-final; 
- 2 for the last sixteen; 
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- 1 for elimination during the group stages; 
- 0 for no participation. 
Lastly, we add operating income provided by Forbes, player values provided by transfermarkt 
and a dummy for new foreign ownership (1 if new, 0 if not). 
 
Data description 
 
The sample consists of a pooled, cross-sectional, time-series panel of team-specific data for 
European soccer. It spans the period from 2005 to 2013, which corresponds to 204 
observations4 (see Appendix 1 for an overview of the teams involved and which years the 
values for the specific teams come from). 
Team values and local competition data were generated by Forbes. Regional per capita 
income data were obtained from Eurostat. FUA population data was available on population 
data. Facility age, ownership and sports performance data were available on Wikipedia. 
Annual global attendance data were obtained from European football statistics. Player values 
were found on transfermarkt. We integrate dummies for championships with England the 
reference and for years with 2013 the reference. Table 2 shows summary statistics for the 
variables used in the regressions. It is important to note that among the nine clubs with a new 
foreign ownership identified in the Introduction (Manchester United, Liverpool, Aston Villa, 
Chelsea, Monaco, Manchester City, Malaga, Anzhi Makhachkala and Paris-Saint-Germain), 
the value of the five English clubs had been estimated annually by Forbes other than Aston 
Villa which had not been included since 2010, whereas the values of Malaga, Anzhi 
Makhachkala, Paris-Saint-Germain and Monaco were not estimated by Forbes until 2013. 
Table 3 provides an overview of financial data at the beginning of new foreign ownership and 
again in 2013. 
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Results 
 
Before presenting our results, two comments must be made. First, our dataset contains 34 
European teams. Nevertheless, only 15 of them were valued by Forbes during the nine 
periods. Consequently, there are too few observations to estimate a panel regression and 
measure a possible individual effect. 
Second, population and attendance could have a close relationship (correlation coefficient = 
0.163, significant at the 5% level). Thus, attendance per game can be endogenously 
determined by population (or by other variables, like income, for example). Theoretically, we 
can take into account this potential endogeneity by finding an instrument variable which has a 
significant effect on attendance (or its logarithm) and no significant effect on club value (or 
its logarithm). Unfortunately, our dataset does not contain this instrument. Consequently, we 
assume that attendance is exogenous. Significance and values for the estimated parameters 
are not sensitive to the presence of attendance.  
Table 4 presents the results obtained by generalized linear squares regressions with time fixed 
effects. We comment on these results, comparing them with those obtained previously by 
Scelles et al. (2013a). The differences between this data and their data for European soccer 
are: the period (2005-2013 instead of 2004-2011); the incorporation of national sports 
performance, operating income and player value; and the consideration of the country effect. 
A R² of 0.698 was obtained in Scelles et al. (2013a), compared to 0.915 in this study. 
Income has a significant positive impact at the 1% level. This finding coincided with that of 
Scelles et al. (2013a) who find no significant impact for three of the four American major 
leagues and even a significantly negative impact in the NBA. Their interpretation is that for 
European clubs it is better to be in an economically prosperous area because of limited 
revenue sharing that exists between teams within a country and also between countries 
Determinants of professional sports firm values in Europe 
(Andreff, 2007; Hoehn & Szymanski, 1999; Szymanski, 2003). Indeed, there are large 
differences in the value national television rights deals between countries, while within each 
domestic league the distribution of rights results in marked differences in the sums earned by 
individual clubs. More generally, an economically prosperous area offers better opportunities 
in terms of sponsoring and merchandising and allows a club to set high prices for tickets to 
attend a match. 
Population has a significant negative impact at the 5% level (a result also reported by Scelles 
et al., 2013a) whereas the impact of local competition is significantly positive at the 10% 
level (significant at the 1% level in Scelles et al., 2013a). A contrary result could have been 
expected, i.e. positive impact of population and negative impact of local competition given 
that a club must share local economic resources with one or several other club. One limitation 
of this study is the fact that not all local rival clubs are incorporated, only those ranked in the 
Forbes lists. 
Facility age has the expected significant negative impact at the 1% level (consistent with 
Scelles et al., 2013a). It supports new facility projects for owners even if it does not solve the 
question of financing between public and private funds. Private ownership has the expected 
significant positive impact at the 1% level (compared to the 5% level in Scelles et al., 2013a). 
As Scelles et al. (2013a) note, this is consistent with the interpretation of Miller (2007, p. 
449) for whom : “A team playing in a stadium that it owns will be able to capitalize the value 
of the stadium in the team’s franchise value and will thus have a higher franchise value.” 
New foreign ownership has a significant positive impact at the 1% level. Irrespective of the 
owners’ objective (profit or utility maximisation), new foreign owners have had a positive 
effect on the values of English clubs as estimated by Forbes. 
Attendance has the expected significant positive impact at the 1% level whereas it had no 
significant impact in Scelles et al. (2013a). Consequently, our result contradicts the 
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interpretation that they formulated. Indeed, Scelles et al. (2013a) put in perspective their 
result for attendance (no significant impact) with the significantly positive impact of income. 
From their point of view, for generating revenue and thus optimizing value, a club needs to 
be in an economically prosperous area within which people are able to spend a lot of money, 
rather than having a stadium full of people but eventually without maximizing gate receipts. 
According to our result, the two dimensions are necessary. 
National sports performances in t and t-1 have no significant impact whereas that in the 
historical period has the expected significant positive impact at the 1% level. Continental 
sports performance in t has no significant impact whereas it has a significant positive impact 
at the 1% level in Scelles et al. (2013a). Continental sports performance in t-1 and historical 
continental sports performance have the expected significant positive impact at the 5% level 
(compared with the 1% level in Scelles et al., 2013a). These results indicate that past sports 
performances (last year and historical ones) are more important than sports performances in t 
in explaining club value in t even if sports performances in t become past ones in t+1. 
Historical sports performances thus seem good measures to capture the historical potential of 
a club, an unsurprising factor to explain team value. 
Operating income and player value have a significant positive impact at the 1% level. While 
these results were expected, it is of note that these variables had never been incorporated 
among potential determinants of professional sports firm values in previous studies. We 
consider the implications of these important results in the next section of the paper. 
The English Premier League is the European league which generates the largest revenues 
(Deloitte, 2013), hence why it was selected as the reference. Germany, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Scotland and Spain have the expected significant negative impact at the 1% level (5% level 
for Netherlands). However, France has no significant impact and Italy has a significantly 
positive impact at the 5% level. Yet, Italy and France had been decreasingly competitive over 
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the period 1996-2013 as their UEFA country ranking indicates (from first to fourth for Italy 
and from second to sixth for France). Are Italian and French soccer clubs overestimated by 
Forbes? Is it due to the specific nature of the Italian and French clubs included in the sample 
which may be unrepresentative of Italian and French clubs as a whole? 
The time dummies 2005 to 2011 are significantly negative at the 1% level whereas 2012 is 
not significant. In Scelles et al. (2013a), only the time dummies 2006 and 2007 are 
significantly negative. Their hypothesis is that the overall European soccer club value 
depends in particular on clubs belonging to the top domestic league. Contrary to American 
clubs in major leagues, European soccer clubs are not certain to participate in the top 
domestic league every season due to the open nature of European football leagues and the 
resultant possibility of relegation (Andreff, 2007; Hoehn & Szymanski, 1999; Noll, 2003; 
Szymanski, 2003). Several clubs ranked by Forbes were relegated during the period studied: 
Leeds United, Newcastle United, West Ham United and Juventus FC, the most prestigious 
and valuable of these clubs. According to Scelles et al. (2013a), it could explain that most of 
time dummies are not significantly negative in comparison with the last year. Nevertheless, 
our results indicate that this is the case except for the last year but one. 
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Discussion, implications and future directions 
 
Discussion 
 
Results for population and local competition 
 
We have already discussed our results individually other than for operating income and 
player value for which implications are developed below. Nevertheless, it seems important to 
emphasise the surprising results for population and local competition. The fact that only the 
most valuable European soccer clubs are taken into account in our study has been mentioned 
as a limitation. We tested our model with local competition, taken as the number of other 
teams playing in the first soccer division during the season under consideration and located in 
the same functional urban area (Mean = 2.5784; SD = 2.2533; Minimum = 0; Maximum = 7). 
Table 5 provides our new results. The impacts of population and competition become 
significant only at the 10% level instead of 5% level but they are still respectively negative 
and positive. We also tested our model with the log of the population divided by the number 
of rival teams instead of the two variables separately, both with only rival teams as listed by 
Forbes and then with all those rivals playing in the first division (Appendices 2 and 3). The 
impact of the new variable is significantly negative at the 1% level in the first model and at 
the 10% in the second model. 
To understand the negative impact of population, the work of Kuper and Szymanski (2012) is 
potentially helpful. They suggest that historically population has had a negative impact on 
success in the Champions League, noting that while provincial towns like Nottingham, 
Glasgow, Dortmund, Birmingham or Rotterdam have all won European Cups [the 
predecessor competition to the Champions League], until 2012 no club from the seven 
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biggest metropolitan areas in Europe (Istanbul, Paris, Moscow, London, St Petersburg, Berlin 
and Athens) had been successful (Kuper & Szymanski, 2012, p. 176). 
The authors propose two reasons to explain this historical underperformance in the 
Champions League: 
- they produce few great soccer players, maybe because there are very few places to kick 
about in the average capital. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that cities like London or Paris are 
more built up than Birmingham or Glasgow; 
- they have less to prove than provincial cities, having alternative sources of pride than their 
soccer teams. However, another interpretation relates to the nature of provincial cities: 
often these cities have a manufacturing base with a different socio-economic mix, which 
may contribute to more passionate supporters, where football is one of few escapes open 
to them.   
The growing importance of commercialisation since the 1980s could have led to European 
capitals becoming the most performing cities (Helleu, 2007). Now, if the small provincial 
towns are not able to perform on a long or even medium term basis anymore, Kuper and 
Szymanski (2012) note that the biggest provincial clubs (Manchester United, Liverpool, 
Bayern, Barcelona, the two Milan clubs) have built up strong brands and are sufficiently 
populated to remain at the top of European soccer. These clubs are not really in the biggest 
provincial cities but they are in the biggest countries in Europe and have the largest television 
deals. These elements are consistent with the negative impact of population on value for the 
clubs in our sample that partially correspond to those described above: London (big capital) 
versus provincial clubs in the biggest countries. The absence of local competitors is globally 
associated with clubs in small provincial towns that are not able to perform consistently over 
the medium term (Newcastle, Olympique Lyonnais, Olympique de Marseille, Stuttgart, 
Werder Bremen, Porto, Valencia). As such, it could explain the positive impact of 
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competition on club value. Another explanation is that rivalry in itself can trigger people’s 
interest for soccer and hence for their local teams. It is well documented that local derbies 
attract more spectators, other things being equal (Baimbridge, Cameron & Dawson, 1996; 
Buraimo & Simmons, 2008; Cairns, 1987; Hart, Hutton & Sharot, 1975; Peel & Thomas, 
1992; Scelles, Durand, Bonnal, Goyeau & Andreff, 2013). 
 
Impact of new ownership on club value 
 
Our results show a significantly positive impact of new ownership in English soccer. The 
impact of new foreign ownership beyond English soccer is also of interest. As indicated 
previously, the values of Malaga, Anzhi Makhachkala, Paris-Saint-Germain and Monaco had 
not been estimated by Forbes until 2013. Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe the 
evolution of player value for Malaga and Anzhi Makhachkala. In 2010, when Sheihk 
Abdullah ben Nasser Al Thani became the owner of Malaga, player value was estimated at 
$80M. At the end of the season 2012-2013, it was estimated at $171M (+115%) but the club 
was subsequently excluded from participating in UEFA competitions for non-payment of 
players wages and tax bills on time and needed to sell its best players (player value at the end 
of 2013 estimated at $72M). In 2010, before Suleyman Kerimov’s takeover of Anzhi 
Makhachkala, player value was estimated at $22M. In 2013, it was estimated at $257M 
(+1088%). Nevertheless, the club did not achieve to win the Russian championship and to 
qualify in the UEFA Champions League and Suleyman Kerimov decided to reduce his 
spending in 2013-2014. For this season, player value was $86M (-66%) and the club was last 
in the Russian championship at the end of 2013. 
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New foreign ownership has a significant positive impact in our model for the most valuable 
English soccer clubs. But at the same time the situation at Malaga and Anzhi Makhachkala 
illustrate risks associated with the dominant or concentrated ownership model. 
 
Implications 
 
Operating income 
 
The first part of the principal objective in this study was to observe if operating income is a 
significant determinant of European professional soccer club value. The results show that it is 
indeed the case. However, some models estimate value from discounted cash flows 
(Markham, 2013). Operating income can be seen as a proxy for cash flows. Consequently, 
operating income could be a proxy for value and so should not be integrated among its 
determinants. Nevertheless, discounted cash flows models are based on the expected future 
profits. Now, operating income in n-1 (since Forbes bases its evaluations for n on the 
financial data in n-1) is not an expected future profit. It can be considered as an indicator for 
managerial and financial expertise which seems a relevant determinant of the value. 
Besides, the hierarchy between clubs for operating income is not coincident with the 
hierarchy for value. For example, in 2005, AC Milan, the third most valuable club, and 
Chelsea, the eighth most valuable club, were the only clubs in the first sixteen which reported 
a negative operating income. More generally, the correlation coefficient between value and 
operating income is 0.61, a good but not very strong one, especially in comparison with the 
correlation coefficient between value and revenue (0.84). The fact that the correlation 
between these two indicators is strong is logical since revenue multiples play a large part in 
Forbes’ clubs valuation (Markham, 2013). 
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With regard to these elements, a previous operating income can be considered as a 
determinant and not the “essence” of value. In other words, the capacity to control costs and 
generate operating income is a determinant of value, but not a necessary condition. A club 
can counterbalance a negative operating income thanks to other determinants. These 
observations may be surprising. In any case, it is preferable to maximize operating income: it 
supposes a financial or managerial expertise beyond commercial and sporting ones (Durand, 
Ravenel & Helleu, 2005). A club must be attentive not only to the importance of good (and 
thus well paid) employees on the field of play, but also off the field of play. 
 
Player value 
 
The second part of our principal objective in this study was to observe if player value is a 
significant determinant of European professional soccer club value. The results show it is the 
case. Consequently, a strategy based on cost minimization to optimize profit and value is not 
a good one since it limits the possibility to have players with high value. Players are part of a 
club’s assets, which in turn legitimises their impact on value especially as they contribute to 
the generation of additional income: i.e. improved sports performances and notoriety will 
attract more spectators in the stadiums, increased merchandising, more sponsors and allow 
the club to earn more money from TV rights (partially linked to sports performances and 
notoriety). 
Our result for player value can be used to deal with the “old” debate about the objective of 
clubs’ owners: are they profit or utility maximizers (Rottenberg, 1956; Sloane, 1971)? This 
traditional distinction offers two types of owners: the American ones who would be interested 
by profit and the European ones who would be interested by success on the pitch. Now, 
European soccer club needs money to build a performing team and good players to generate 
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money. In other words, a virtuous circle must be implemented. More specifically, buying best 
players is only one way of optimizing player value. Other solutions exist, for example: 
investment in performance and training facilities; investment in youth development; 
managerial selection and ability. 
It seems important to stress the fact that our result for player value are in respect of the most 
valuable European soccer clubs which thus have the best players. It would be interesting to 
consider whether this result would be replicated for clubs at other levels. Perhaps the lack of 
difference for player value among these clubs would make the variable not significant in 
explaining club value. Another point is that for these clubs, player value is perhaps more 
related to their potential sale value (rather than their contribution to incremental income like 
the sale of merchandise) than for the best clubs. Now, beyond player quality and 
performance, potential sale value is dependent on the remaining duration for the player 
contract. Besides, potential sale value is a theoretical one which may be impacted by a lot of 
factors: injury, player fit, demand by other clubs, number of other players with similar skills 
in other clubs etc. Thus, for clubs which are less financially developed it is interesting to 
consider whether player value is really taken into account by the market. 
Lastly, the significantly positive impact of player values on European soccer team values 
suggests that we should test this variable in the American major leagues. However, as player 
values are not available for these leagues, it is necessary to provide an estimation. It is worth 
noting that transfers are prohibited in the American major leagues thus American teams 
cannot expect revenues from the sales of their best players. It does not mean that having a 
good player is without impact on team value, however, since it could improve the team sports 
performance and thus its value (even although the literature provides inconsistent results 
about the impact of recent sports performances on team values). Büschemann and Deutscher 
(2011) use team payrolls as a proxy for player values and find a significantly positive impact 
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on team values in the National Hockey League (NHL). Nevertheless, it is not clear that team 
payrolls can be considered as a good proxy for player values. Indeed, players can play at a 
higher or lower level than expected given their salaries. In such a case, the interest in 
calculating player values is to incorporate their current level and not only their expected 
quality given that their salaries could have been negotiated two or three years previously. 
 
Global results 
 
Operating income and player value optimizations are just two parts of the more global club 
value optimization. Our results show that other determinants are significant (we leave aside 
population and local competition for reasons provided previously): inhabitants’ income, 
facility age, private ownership, attendance, continental sports performance during the last 
year, historical sports performance both in national and continental competitions and the 
national league in which the club is involved. Whether they are tangible (players, stadium) or 
intangible (club prestige, national league and its TV rights, fanbase and customer catchment 
area – some elements we can consider as related to club brand), all these determinants are 
part of team assets and owners and managers must be attentive to every asset’s contribution 
to the value of a club. Nevertheless, they do not monitor all of them: inhabitants’ income does 
not depend on the club strategy; a new facility can depend on a public decision; attendance 
can be limited by local potential; historical sports performance cannot be changed in the short 
or medium term; the club is under the influence of the national league prestige and strategy. 
Owners and managers must optimize every determinant under the constraints of the local 
context, the club history and the league in which it operates. 
An interesting question is how a club should prioritize its investment? Allouche and Soulez 
(2005, p. 8) note that “the hypothesis is often moved forward that Manchester United had 
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taken advantage of its stock exchange introduction for having used, in priority, funds raised 
by the introduction to finance structural investments (stadiums, facilities). On the contrary, 
the symmetric hypothesis is formulated about clubs that had not taken advantage of their 
introduction, which wants that raised funds had been used, in priority, to finance risky 
transfers.” This second hypothesis can be illustrated by the examples of Newcastle, Leeds 
United and Borussia Dortmund which invested in players instead of stadium. However, 
according to our results, investment in players is important. When Newcastle invested in Les 
Ferdinand, David Ginola and Alan Shearer in the middle of the 1990s, it reinforced the club 
value and led it in the top of the English Premier League. Thereafter the club did not sustain 
the same level of sports performance. Perhaps more balanced investments between players 
and structural assets would have been better. Rather than prioritizing one determinant, owners 
and managers must be attentive to all the significant determinants and be aware that both 
profit and utility maximizations are compatible and even necessary to value maximization. 
Future owners and managers can take into account all the significant determinants before 
deciding to choose a club. 
 
Future directions 
 
In our results, we suggest the necessity to extend the number of teams evaluated so as to 
observe if the impacts of population and local competition remain respectively negative and 
positive. Indeed, Forbes is based on only 20 - 25 clubs, whereas there are 114 teams in the 
first divisions alone of the six major European leagues (England, France, Germany, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain). We can anticipate that the sign of the impact for population will change 
with a larger number of teams. The problem is that Forbes publishes value only for 20 
European soccer clubs and is not clear about its exact calculation and methodology. A 
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solution would be to apply a precise method to value soccer clubs. Markham (2013) proposes 
such a method to value English Premier League clubs. The format of his multivariate model 
is the following: 
Club Valuation = (Revenue + Net Assets) x (Net Profit + Revenue) / Revenue x (Stadium 
Capacity %) / (Wage Ratio %) 
It could be interesting to apply this model for all the clubs in the first divisions alone of the 
six major European leagues during several seasons, to validate the relevance of the values 
obtained and if so, to test determinants, in particular to observe the results obtained for 
population and competition but also for player value when the best clubs are excluded in the 
analysis. 
In our model, R² is equal to 0.907 and even 0.915 when we include new ownership. It means 
that the model is very successful in explaining the determinants of the European soccer club 
values as provided by Forbes. Nevertheless, at least one interesting variable has been 
overlooked: the international dimension of firms. Indeed, soccer is the most widespread sport 
in the world (Desbordes, 2007). The best soccer clubs have fans everywhere and are powerful 
global brands (Couveleare & Richelieu, 2005). They have sponsorship deals with 
international firms: for example, Dubai’s Emirates Airline (Real Madrid), Chevrolet 
(Manchester United) and Qatar Foundation (FC Barcelona). How can we measure the 
international dimension of such firms? One option may be to incorporate social media in 
value models (Scelles et al., 2013a). Their hypothesis is that the number of fans on Facebook 
or the number of followers on Twitter can be a measure of an international dimension. 
Scelles, Helleu, Durand and Bonnal (2013b) incorporate social media in their communication 
about values in the United States and Europe. They suggest that the great differences between 
major European soccer and American clubs (more fans and followers for the former ones) are 
the consequence of a successful European soccer club’s ability to attract foreign fans. They 
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find a significantly positive impact of the number of fans on Facebook on values. One 
problem, however, is that they are not able to distinguish domestic and foreign fans. 
Moreover, their contribution deals with only one year (141 observations). It would be 
interesting to extend this study in distinguishing domestic and foreign fans. To confirm the 
potential interest of social media, it is convenient to note that Forbes has also identified this 
factor as relevant5. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article we have estimated a value equation for major European soccer teams over the 
period 2005-2013 based on Forbes data. We included variables proposed in the literature as 
explanatory factors and three original determinants: operating income, player value and new 
foreign ownership. The results show that these factors are significant. While new ownership 
may be specific to European soccer over the period studied, operating income and player 
value are more generic and hence could be incorporated in future research testing the 
determinants of professional sports firm values in other sports and other countries. If such 
research confirms the significantly positive impact of operating income and player value, 
these variables could be considered as determinants to be systematically included in studies 
about the determinants of team values. More generally, team assets (financial expertise and 
player value but also stadium age and type of ownership, number and fans’ income, and past 
sports performances) have a significant impact. Owners and managers must be attentive to 
every asset’s contribution to the value of a club. This can contribute to an apparent 
contradiction: to have players with high value needs high salary expenses, which in turn can 
be seen as diminishing operating income. Nevertheless, to have players with high value 
increases revenues, with a positive impact on club value. 
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In the last part of the article, we proposed directions for future research: increasing the 
number of evaluated teams in European soccer (perhaps building on the model proposed by 
Markham, 2013) and integrating an international dimension which can be measured through 
the number of fans or followers on social media (Facebook and Twitter). The incorporation 
of this variable could allow a better specification of the model and a better understanding of 
the determinants of team values in Europe but also in the United States. 
 
Notes 
 
1
 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Football_Transfers, retrieved 02/10/2013. 
2
 Source: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/teams/real-madrid/10291251/Gareth-Bales-world-record-
transfer-fails-to-slow-down-Real-Madrid-as-club-announces-rise-in-profits.html, retrieved 02/10/2013. 
3
 Source: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-2421832/Cristiano-Ronaldo-salary-record--wages-
steadily-increasing.html, retrieved 02/10/2013. 
4
 Forbes proposed 205 observations but for the first time in 2013, a non-European club was ranked (Brazil’s 
Corinthians Paulista). 
5 Source: http://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2013/07/15/barcelona-and-real-madrid-rule-social-
media/ 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 Literature review - determinants of professional sports firm values 
Authors Periods Variables MLB NBA NFL NHL 
American 
major 
leagues 
European 
soccer 
Alexander 
& Kern 
(2004) 
1991-
1997 
Income 
Population 
Sports performance t-1 
New facility 
Identity 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
(+) 
(-) 
+ 
+ 
(+) 
(-) 
(+) 
(+) 
+ 
(+) 
(-) 
(-) 
+ 
+ 
+ 
(-) 
  
Miller 
(2007) 
1990-
2002 
Income 
Population 
Sports performance t 
Sports performance t-1 
Facility age 
Franchise age 
Years in city 
Private ownership 
(+) 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
(-) 
(+) 
(+) 
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Humphreys 
& Mondello 
(2008) 
1969-
2006 
(MLB is 
the 
reference) 
NBA 
NFL 
NHL 
Population 
Private ownership 
Franchise age 
Local competition 
Sports performance last 5 years 
Facility age 
    
(+) 
+ 
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
(-) 
(-) 
 
Miller 
(2009) 
1991-
2005 
(1991-
2004 for 
NHL 
because 
of 
lockout) 
Income 
Population 
Sports performance t 
Sports performance t-1 
Facility age 
Years in city 
Private ownership 
 
+ 
(+) 
(+) 
+ 
(-) 
(-) 
(-) 
+ 
(-) 
(-) 
(+) 
- 
(-) 
(-) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
+ 
(-) 
(-) 
+ 
  
Humphreys 
& Lee 
(2010) 
1960-
2009 
Facility age 
Sports performance last 10 years 
Historical sports performance 
Population 
    
(+) 
+ 
(-) 
+ 
 
Büschemann 
& Deutscher 
(2011) 
2000-
2009 
(except 
season 
2004-
2005) 
Population 
Payroll 
Fan Cost Index 
Years in the league 
Sports performance t-1 
Facility age 
Attendance 
   
+ 
+ 
(+) 
(-) 
(+) 
- 
+ 
  
Scelles, 
Helleu, 
Durand & 
Bonnal 
(2013a)1 
2004-
2011 
Income 
Population 
Local competition 
Facility age 
Private ownership 
Attendance 
Sports performance t 
Sports performance t-1 
Historical sports performance 
(+) 
+ 
(-) 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
(-) 
+ 
- 
+ 
(+) 
(+) 
(-) 
+ 
+ 
(+) 
+ 
(-) 
+ 
- 
- 
+ 
+ 
(+) 
(+) 
+ 
(-) 
+ 
(+) 
(+) 
+ 
+ 
(+) 
(+) 
+ 
 
+ 
- 
+ 
- 
+ 
(+) 
+ 
+ 
+ 
The result is significant at the 5% level if the sign is not in brackets; the result is not significant at the 5% level 
if the sign is in brackets. 
1 Scelles et al. (2013a) include sports performance in the UEFA Champions League for European soccer. 
 
Table 2 Summary statistics 
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Value ($Mil) 591.66 506.99 106 3,300 
Income ($) 29,364 7,038 9,471 47,908 
Population (Mil) 5.8302 3.8601 1.1844 12.4484 
Local competition 0.9608 1.0611 0 3 
Facility age 69.6814 41.6654 0 136 
Private ownership 0.6765 0.4678 0 1 
New foreign ownership 0.1569 0.3637 0 1 
Attendance 51,000 14,680 18,085 80,521 
National sports performance t 64.80% 13.01% 25% 89.47% 
National sports performance t-1 64.53% 12.85% 18.42% 89.47% 
National historical sports 
performance 13.62% 11.86% 0% 52.58% 
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Continental sports performance t 1.6569 1.7684 0 6 
Continental sports performance t-1 1.7206 1.7279 0 6 
Continental historical sports 
performance 3.30% 4.49% 0% 18% 
Operating income ($Mil) 31.3410 49.1725 -123 214 
Player value ($Mil) 338.48 174.09 88.16 863.54 
Number of observations 204 
 
Table 3 Financial data (in M$) for clubs with new foreign ownership 
Clubs and year 
for new foreign 
ownership 
Data at the beginning of new foreign 
ownership1 Data in 2013 
Club 
value Revenues 
Operating 
income 
Player 
value 
Club 
value Revenues 
Operating 
income 
Player 
value 
Chelsea (2003) 339 154 -19 527 901 409 82 525 
Manchester 
United (2005) 1251 315 106 473 3165 502 144 446 
Aston Villa 
(2006) 120 94 11 135 - - - 97 
Liverpool (2007) 454 225 37 420 651 296 19 332 
Manchester City 
(2008) 191 114 27 220 689 362 -53 571 
Malaga (2010) - - - 80 - - - 72 
Anzhi 
Makhachkala 
(2010) 
- - - 22 - - - 86 
Paris (2011) - 139 -41 145 - 286 11 428 
Monaco (2011-
2012) - 53 -26 63 - 27 -35 257 
1
 For Chelsea, 2004 Forbes data for club value, revenues and operating income, 2005 for player value. 
Player values are those in t. Other data for Chelsea and Manchester City are based on Forbes (revenues and 
operating income in t-1), not for Paris and Monaco (revenues and operating income in t at the beginning of new 
foreign ownership but in t-1 for data in 2013 because those in t were not available when the article was 
submitted). These data for Malaga and Anzhi Makhachkala are not available. 
 
Table 4 Estimates of the log-value equation 
Variable Coefficient se 
Intercept 5.7538*** 2.1132 
Log-income 0.5115*** 0.1454 
Log-population -0.1414** 0.0616 
Local competition 0.0852* 0.0437 
Facility age -0.0039*** 0.0009 
Private ownership 0.4730*** 0.1606 
New foreign ownership 0.2980*** 0.1041 
Log-attendance 0.3268*** 0.1067 
National sports performance t -0.2366 0.2468 
National sports performance t-1 0.3434 0.2460 
Historical national sports performance 1.6976*** 0.5401 
Continental sports performance t -0.0033 0.0169 
Continental sports performance t-1 0.0433** 0.0175 
Historical continental sports 
performance 1.9456** 0.9794 
Operating income 0.0036*** 0.0006 
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Player value 0.3718*** 0.1002 
England ref. 
France 0.1644 0.2027 
Germany -0.2666*** 0.0761 
Italy 0.3875** 0.1945 
Netherlands -0.7220** 0.3627 
Portugal -1.2016*** 0.2086 
Scotland -0.9148*** 0.2689 
Spain -0.3371*** 0.1231 
2005 -0.2446*** 0.0934 
2006 -0.4660*** 0.0985 
2007 -0.5747*** 0.0999 
2008 -0.4488*** 0.0990 
2009 -0.3537*** 0.0962 
2010 -0.3126*** 0.0920 
2011 -0.4064*** 0.1043 
2012 -0.1384* 0.0926 
2013 ref. 
R² 0.915 
Number of observations 204 
Note: * significance at 10%, ** significance at 5%, *** significance at 1%. 
 
Table 5 Estimates of the log-value equation with local competition as the number of 
other teams playing in the first soccer division during the season considered and located 
in the functional urban area  
Variable Coefficient se 
Intercept 5.6240*** 2.1045 
Log-income 0.5561*** 0.1647 
Log-population -0.1337* 0.0748 
Local competition 0.0273* 0.0218 
Facility age -0.0038*** 0.0009 
Private ownership 0.4388** 0.1629 
New foreign ownership 0.2823*** 0.1028 
Log-attendance 0.3140*** 0.1035 
National sports performance t -0.2042 0.2469 
National sports performance t-1 0.3947** 0.2466 
Historical national sports performance 1.6400*** 0.5622 
Continental sports performance t -0.0007 0.0169 
Continental sports performance t-1 0.0455*** 0.0176 
Historical continental sports 
performance 2.0548** 0.9885 
Operating income 0.0036*** 0.0006 
Player value 0.3568*** 0.1003 
England ref. 
France 0.0868 0.1986 
Germany -0.3207*** 0.0742 
Italy 03168 0.1896 
Netherlands -0.9619*** 0.3302 
Portugal -1.2553*** 0.2079 
Scotland -0.9676*** 0.2707 
Spain -0.3995*** 0.1227 
2005 -0.2483*** 0.0930 
2006 -0.4615*** 0.0974 
2007 -0.5695*** 0.1006 
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2008 -0.4434*** 0.1001 
2009 -0.3649*** 0.0969 
2010 -0.3342*** 0.0933 
2011 -0.4139*** 0.1062 
2012 -0.1449* 0.0921 
2013 ref. 
R² 0.913 
Number of observations 204 
Note: * significance at 10%, ** significance at 5%, *** significance at 1%. 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 Overview of teams involved and years the values come from 
 
Countries Teams Years 
England 
Arsenal 2005-2013 
Aston Villa 2005-2009 
Chelsea 2005-2013 
Everton 2006-2009 
Leeds United 2005 
Liverpool 2005-2013 
Manchester City 2005-2013 
Manchester United 2005-2013 
Newcastle United 2005-2010, 2013 
Tottenham Hotspur 2005-2013 
West Ham United 2007-2008 
France Lyon 2005-2013 Marseille 2005, 2007-2013 
Germany 
Bayer Leverkusen 2006 
Bayern Munich 2005-2013 
Borussia Dortmund 2005-2013 
Hamburg 2007-2013 
Schalke 04 2005-2013 
Stuttgart 2009, 2011 
Werder Bremen 2008-2011 
Italy 
AC Milan 2005-2013 
AS Roma 2005-2010, 2012 
Inter Milan 2005-2013 
Juventus 2005-2013 
Lazio Roma 2005 
Napoli 2013 
Netherlands Ajax Amsterdam 2005-2007 
Portugal FC Porto 2005-2006 
Scotland Celtic Glasgow 2005-2009 Glasgow Rangers 2005-2007, 2009 
Spain 
Atletico Madrid 2011 
Barcelona 2005-2013 
Real Madrid 2005-2013 
Valencia 2006, 2008, 2012 
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Appendix 2 Estimates of the log-value equation with log-population divided with the 
number of rivalling teams listed by Forbes   
Variable Coefficient se 
Intercept 6.1879*** 2.0747 
Log-income 0.5549*** 0.1397 
Log-population / Rivalling teams -0.1812*** 0.0650 
Facility age -0.0042*** 0.0009 
Private ownership 0.5001** 0.1584 
New foreign ownership 0.3096*** 0.1023 
Log-attendance 0.3222*** 0.1041 
National sports performance t -0.1875 0.2535 
National sports performance t-1 0.3462 0.2423 
Historical national sports performance 1.5775*** 0.5139 
Continental sports performance t -0.0028 0.0168 
Continental sports performance t-1 0.0432** 0.0174 
Historical continental sports 
performance 2.1005** 0.9375 
Operating income 0.0036*** 0.0006 
Player value 0.3591*** 0.1011 
England ref. 
France 0.1512 0.1927 
Germany -0.3030*** 0.0653 
Italy 0.3865** 0.1821 
Netherlands -0.7032** 0.3551 
Portugal -1.2167*** 0.2078 
Scotland -0.9442*** 0.2662 
Spain -0.3280*** 0.1210 
2005 -0.2513*** 0.0922 
2006 -0.4682*** 0.0975 
2007 -0.5733*** 0.0982 
2008 -0.4507*** 0.0952 
2009 -0.3576*** 0.0918 
2010 -0.3212*** 0.0891 
2011 -0.4169*** 0.1032 
2012 -0.1394 0.0921 
2013 ref. 
R² 0.916 
Number of observations 204 
Note: * significance at 10%, ** significance at 5%, *** significance at 1%. 
 
Appendix 3 Estimates of the log-value equation with log-population divided with the 
number of rivalling teams in the first division   
Variable Coefficient se 
Intercept 5.8285*** 2.0888 
Log-income 0.4838*** 0.1359 
Log-population / Rivalling teams -0.1161* 0.0673 
Facility age -0.0034*** 0.0008 
Private ownership 0.4056** 0.1538 
New foreign ownership 0.2672 0.0983 
Log-attendance 0.2915*** 0.1008 
National sports performance t -0.2902 0.2551 
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National sports performance t-1 0.3562 0.2439 
Historical national sports performance 1.9226*** 0.4975 
Continental sports performance t -0.0007 0.0167 
Continental sports performance t-1 0.0474*** 0.0172 
Historical continental sports 
performance 1.5973* 0.9263 
Operating income 0.0036*** 0.0006 
Player value 0.3818*** 0.1008 
England ref. 
France 0.1315 0.1983 
Germany -0.2533*** 0.0629 
Italy 0.2999* 0.1751 
Netherlands -0.9667*** 0.3277 
Portugal -1.3158*** 0.2004 
Scotland -1.0486*** 0.2652 
Spain -0.4178*** 0.1104 
2005 -0.2375** 0.0923 
2006 -0.4413*** 0.0949 
2007 -0.5468*** 0.0949 
2008 -0.4215*** 0.0913 
2009 -0.3402*** 0.0891 
2010 -0.3116*** 0.0876 
2011 -0.3977*** 0.1015 
2012 -0.1410 0.0914 
2013 ref. 
R² 0.906 
Number of observations 204 
Note: * significance at 10%, ** significance at 5%, *** significance at 1%. 
 
